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THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
PERSPECTIVE 
TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We applaud Professor Merrill’s bold and noteworthy effort to engage in a 
dialogue with political scientists who study the Supreme Court.  He navigates a 
substantial body of social science scholarship largely ignored by legal scholars, 
but he does so with the critical eye of someone who firmly believes that “the 
law” matters.  The result is keenly and refreshingly original and should 
influence work on both sides of the Supreme Court scholarship divide. 
The most significant aspect of Merrill’s article is his consideration of the 
Supreme Court as an institution.  Court studies frequently treat the Court as a 
collection of individuals who act in response to personal views; the attitudinal 
model that Merrill discusses takes such a classical, micro-level approach.  An 
institutional perspective, by contrast, emphasizes the influence of interactions 
among the Justices, as well as the context within which they make decisions.  
Merrill lucidly delineates both the internal and external aspects of institutional 
analysis.  We wish to add an element to the Merrill model that we believe 
enriches it without diminishing its parsimony.  The external characteristic that 
we consider is the Supreme Court’s organizational relationship with lower 
courts, particularly courts of appeals. 
Like Congress, the Supreme Court must delegate a great deal of its work, 
in this case to lower courts rather than to agencies.  Since the Supreme Court is 
formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s decisions can be 
conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its agents, the 
lower courts.  The Supreme Court has limited resources to monitor the actions 
of lower federal courts and state courts; therefore, the possibility arises that 
judges will not comply with Supreme Court preferences.  The Court obviously 
wishes to check these inconsistent rulings, but monitoring and enforcement is 
costly.  We consider what the theory of congressional-bureaucratic relations 
 
* Tracey E. George is Professor of Law and Albert H. Yoon is Assistant Professor of Law and 
Assistant Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Northwestern University.  We thank 
William Hof and the other members of the Saint Louis University Law Journal staff for their 
outstanding work on the Childress Lecture events. 
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can tell us about the Supreme Court’s relational contract with lower courts, 
and, in particular, we consider whether it offers additional insight to the 
transition from the first to the second Rehnquist Court. 
II.  THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO LOWER FEDERAL COURTS 
The United States Supreme Court is a constitutionally mandated national 
court that has ultimate authority over federal constitutional questions and final 
judicial say on interpretation of federal statutes.  The Court’s power, therefore, 
is immense.  Its capacity for exercising that power, however, is constrained: As 
Merrill observes, it can consider annually only a limited number of disputes.1  
The Court greatly widens the scope of its power by delegating to lower courts.  
Congress has created an expansive federal judiciary that can assist the Supreme 
Court, and states have established separate court systems that can also 
implement Justices’ rulings.  In order to understand the consequences of the 
Supreme Court’s delegation of its authority to lower courts, we can look to the 
extensive literature on congressional delegation to administrative agencies. 
The dominant theory of the congressional-bureaucratic system draws on 
the principal-agent model of economics.2  The model addresses a situation 
where one party (the agent) takes an action on behalf of another party (the 
principal).  The authority relation is a type of contractual arrangement whereby 
the principal assigns limited powers to an agent in order to increase efficiency.3  
The agent has distinct interests that may be in conflict with the principal’s.  
The theory explains that the principal cannot perfectly control the agent’s 
behavior, but can minimize conflicts through monitoring and incentives that 
form part of the agreement.4  The principal-agent model clarifies several key 
 
 1. Thomas M. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 578 (2003). 
 2. While the principal-agent relationship in law is roughly analogous to principal-agent 
theory, it is a distinct construct.  Here, we are referring to a particular paradigm developed in 
economics and political science that examines the relationship of individuals with related 
authority but conflicting interests.  See Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984).  For early applications to public administration, see Mathew D. 
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Barry M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency: 
The Policing “Paradox” and Regulatory Behavior, 24 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1975); Barry R. 
Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 44 PUB. 
CHOICE 147 (1984). 
 3. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937) 
(setting forth, in the landmark article on organizational theory, an explanation for the existence of 
firms and a contractual account of firm hierarchical structure). 
 4. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780-83 (1972) (developing the related concepts of 
shirking and monitoring in an organization). 
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features of organizational relationships: the probability of conflicting interests,5 
the need for mechanisms of control,6 and the crucial value of information.7 
Bureaucrats act pursuant to statutory authority, but derive utility from 
making decisions that they prefer.8  Bureaucrats’ preferences may align with 
Congress’s, but a major influence on legislators’ preferences—election—is 
absent.9 Congress cannot write statutes that are sufficiently detailed to 
constrain agencies completely.  Bureaucrats have opportunities to extract rents 
or to shirk as a consequence of discretion coupled with information 
asymmetries.10 The principal-agent model helps us to conceptualize the 
politician-bureaucrat relation, as Moe explains, because it 
focuses on information asymmetry and, in particular, on information available 
to bureaucrats—about their true “types” (honesty, personal goals, policy 
positions) and their true performance—that politicians do not automatically 
possess and often can only acquire with much imprecision and expense.  It 
then encourages us to inquire into the monitoring devices and incentive 
structures—aspects of institutional design—that mitigate the asymmetry and 
thus minimize the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that will 
otherwise cause bureaucrats to depart from their political directives.11 
 
 5. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (“The problem of 
inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.  
It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts . . . .”). 
 6. See generally PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND 
MANAGEMENT (1992); GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF HIERARCHY (1992). 
 7. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Control in Large Organizations, 10 MGMT. SCI. 397, 404 (1964) 
(explaining why managers in large organizations will lack information about activities and the 
costs associated with communicating information within an organization). 
 8. The literature generally assumes that agents have their own utility function that is related 
to “private political values, personal career objectives, or, all else being equal, an aversion to 
effort.”  David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and 
Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 n.2 (1994).  Legislators can seek to control 
bureaucrats’ preferences by selecting only like-minded agents to staff agencies.  Randall L. 
Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 590-
91, 593-95 (1989) (presenting a game theoretic analysis of agency control by well-chosen 
appointments).  Of course, this is a power limited by the reality of the appointments and hiring 
process and the problem of adverse selection.  Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 
75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-37 (1989). 
 9. See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR 
DISTRICTS (1978); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). 
 10. See generally JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING AND SABOTAGE: 
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (1997); MILLER, supra note 6, at 123-25; 
Moe, supra note 2, at 755. 
 11. Moe, supra note 2, at 766. 
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The Supreme Court and lower federal courts are in an analogous agency 
relationship.12  The Court enunciates doctrine that is effectuated by lower 
courts.  The Court is not capable of deciding cases that cover all possible sets 
of case facts, nor of writing decisions that are sufficiently explicit to allow for 
only one outcome in a particular dispute.13  Thus, lower court judges may 
make decisions that are different from those that the Court would otherwise 
have made.  Circuit and district judges have their own preferences that reflect 
many factors, including policy goals, legal perspective, professional objectives, 
and personal desires.14  If those preferences are congruent with the Court’s 
majority, then the judge will have no incentive to depart from the Court’s 
preferences.  If the preferences are divergent, a judge has an incentive to make 
a non-complying ruling. 
The Supreme Court’s obvious mechanism of control over lower court 
judges is reversal of their decisions.  Likewise, the circuit judge’s decision to 
make a decision on her ideal point, rather than the Court’s, will be affected by 
the availability of sanctions and the probability that she will be caught.15  That 
is, a judge will consider the probability of reversal by the Supreme Court.  
Although the likelihood of reversal is relatively small given the Court’s limited 
caseload, the cost of reversal may be perceived as higher than a rational actor 
model would dictate.16  For example, lower court judges who aspire to 
promotion to a higher court know that their success will depend in part on an 
evaluation of the number of times they have been reversed.17 
 
 12. See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model 
of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994); Matt Spitzer & Eric 
Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2000). 
 13. See generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME 
COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986); Bradley C. 
Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 109 (1973). 
 14. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161-62 (1921) 
(observing that a judge, though not wholly free, has sufficiently wide discretion and will exercise 
it based on “all his ingredients”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? 
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2, 31-39 (1993). 
 15. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 2, at 249 (1987) (describing how the presence 
of sanctions multiplied by the likelihood of detection will deter noncompliance by agents). 
 16. Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a 
Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 (1978) (finding that stigma results from reversal); Lawrence 
Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions: An Organizational Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86 
(1976); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994). 
 17. For an example, we need look no further than recently confirmed Bush nominee, Dennis 
Shedd.  See Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed 
Nominees, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations_appeals.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2003) 
(reporting that the Senate confirmed Shedd on November 19 with fifty-five ayes and forty-four 
nays).  New Fourth Circuit Judge Shedd was questioned during his Senate Judiciary Committee 
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Some scholars have concluded that administrative agencies are essentially 
autonomous because Congress reviews very few agency decisions, plays a 
limited role in selecting administrative employees, and generally ignores 
agency operations.18  We could make the same assertion about lower federal 
courts’ relationship with the Rehnquist Court.  The Rehnquist Court reviews 
very few lower court rulings—less than one-half of 1% of circuit decisions.  
The Court has no role in the selection of circuit and district judges.  Thus, we 
may conclude that circuit courts are basically free to do as they please.  
Consider, for example, that popular commentaries have frequently described 
the Ninth Circuit during the Rehnquist Era as a runaway court.19 
Infrequent review, however, does not necessarily mean rogue agents.  The 
most obvious point is one of observational equivalence:20 The Rehnquist Court 
may be reviewing fewer cases because lower courts are hewing closely to the 
Court’s preferred positions.  Even if lower courts have conflicting interests, 
they may be constrained by actions other than the risk of direct Supreme Court 
review of their rulings.  In the public administration literature, scholars have 
demonstrated that legislatures use the language of statutes and the delineation 
of procedures to constrain agencies.21  Likewise, the Rehnquist Court may use 
 
hearing about a decision he made as a South Carolina district judge that was ultimately reversed 
by the Supreme Court.  Jonathan Groner, ‘Pledge’ Case Stokes Debate: Judicial Nominations 
Rhetoric Flies After Ruling. Also, Shedd Gets Hearing for Fourth Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, July 1, 
2002, at 16 (reporting Senate hearing questions regarding Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D. 
S.C. 1997), aff’d, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)). 
 18. See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). 
 19. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court That Ruled on Pledge Often Runs Afoul of Justices, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2002, at 1; Ashbel S. Green, Justice O’Connor Chides 9th Circuit for Frequently 
Reversed Decisions, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 20, 1997, at C5; Martin Kasindorf, The Court 
Conservatives Hate, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2003, at A3. 
 20. Weingast and Moran made this argument about Congress: “[T]he evidence marshalled to 
support the theory of agency independence—namely, the infrequency and superficiality of 
congressional hearings and investigations—is also consistent with a theory of congressional 
control of regulatory policy.”  Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, The Myth of Runaway 
Bureaucracy: The Case of the FTC, REG., May/June 1982, at 33, 34.  Weingast and Moran 
considered the case of the FTC in the 1970s, when it was considered by many to be a classic case 
of a runaway agency.  They conclude that turnover and change in the composition of the Senate 
committee with oversight (the subcommittee on consumer affairs) reveals that the FTC was not 
out of line with the Senate preferences, as reflected in the relevant committee—until near the end 
of the 70s and early 80s.  Id. at 33-38. 
 21. See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 
(1999); JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION?: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002) (arguing that legislatures use specificity in 
statutory language to micromanage bureaucracy and testing this theory against state laws on 
Medicaid); McCubbins et al., supra note 8 (showing that Congress controls substantive output of 
agencies through the specification of procedures). 
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the language of its decisions and the structure of doctrine to limit options of 
lower courts. 
How does the Supreme Court learn whether the courts of appeals are 
reaching decisions that conflict with the Court’s preferences?  For perfect 
enforcement, the Court would review every decision of the courts of appeals.  
The sheer volume of circuit decisions, however, make micromanagement 
infeasible.  The Court must instead look for signals in individual cases and 
look more carefully at petitions in those cases.  The Court also can decide to 
monitor certain circuits closely: those circuits with which it expects to disagree 
or that are likely to give it fodder for watershed rulings. 
The Rehnquist Court may also be relying on others to alert them to 
divergent lower court rulings.  McCubbins and Schwartz argued that Congress 
does not need to patrol all agency decisions because it can rely on fire alarms 
sounded by interested parties.22  Businesses and state governments have been 
particularly active in the past two decades, resulting in the availability of 
experienced, credible parties with compatible interests to inform the Court.23  
In turn, the Rehnquist Court, like previous Courts, has been more likely to 
grant review to a case in which interest groups, as amici curiae or litigants, 
urge review.24 
The Rehnquist Court may be looking for signals from the circuits 
themselves.25  Monitoring the decisions of each circuit to learn if any three-
judge or en banc panels have breached the agency agreement, however, is 
difficult and consumes limited resources.  The Court will be more likely to 
learn of a breach when a circuit judge dissents because that judge has access to 
greater information than the Justices and has an incentive to set forth in an 
opinion reasons for Supreme Court review.  Moreover, the mere fact of a 
dissent signals to the Court that it may justifiably expend resources to review 
the case or, at least, to look more closely at the petition for certiorari.26  Studies 
 
 22. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984); see also Weingast, supra note 
2 (arguing that Congress monitors bureaucrats by constituency “decibel meters”). 
 23. See Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & 
POL. 639 (1993). 
 24. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest 
Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335 (John B. Gates & Charles A. 
Johnson eds., 1991). 
 25. Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., One Principal and Multiple Agents: Supreme Court Auditing 
of the United States Courts of Appeals (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
 26. See Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 
719 (1987) (explaining that dissents are often considered by majority judges as signals to the 
Supreme Court that the case is worthy of a grant of certiorari); see also Frank B. Cross & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998) (arguing that, under a 
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also have found that a circuit court’s reversal of a lower court or agency’s 
decision,27 as well as en banc hearing, may act as a signal to the Supreme 
Court that the case presents an issue demanding an authoritative review.28 
A circuit court’s composition may be another signal that a decision 
conflicts with the Court majority’s position.  The courts of appeals affect the 
Supreme Court’s agenda when they make decisions with which the Court 
disagrees, requiring the Court to take action to correct.29  One would expect, 
under this model, an ideologically conscious Court to grant review and then 
reverse divergent opinions in the lower courts.  Thus, the changes in the 
Rehnquist Court’s docket may reflect changes in circuit courts. 
The circuits also can influence the Court’s agenda by anticipating or 
moving ahead of the Court on certain issues, taking the lead on new legal 
questions or new approaches.  Thus, the Court also can decide to monitor 
closely circuits that are likely to give it fodder for watershed rulings. 
III.  REHNQUIST COURT MONITORING OF CIRCUIT COURTS 
In the principal-agent model, Supreme Court Justices utilize certiorari 
review to monitor the activities of its agents, namely court of appeals judges 
applying Supreme Court doctrine.  As previously mentioned, one would 
expect, under this model, the Court to grant review and then reverse divergent 
opinions in the lower courts.  If the Supreme Court uses certiorari primarily as 
a means of controlling recalcitrant circuits, it should reverse most of the 
decisions that it reviews.  There is, in fact, a significant body of work that 
establishes exactly this pattern.30 
 
sophisticated model of judicial behavior, circuit judges are most likely to dissent when a panel 
reaches a decision that is contrary both to existing Court precedent and to their preferences). 
 27. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24 (observing that judicial clerks’ memoranda on 
certiorari regularly note a circuit’s reversal and presenting systematic evidence that the Court, 
statistically, is significantly more likely to grant certiorari when the appeals court reversed the 
lower court or agency). 
 28. See Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United 
States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 S. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 195-197 (2001) (finding that the 
Supreme Court was more likely to review a en banc decision than a panel ruling). 
 29. For a development and empirical test of this model, see Charles M. Cameron et al., 
Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s 
Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 (2000). 
 30. See, e.g., Virginia C. Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by the 
Warren and Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141, 149 (1982) (finding 
that the Burger Court was more likely to grant certiorari to liberal appeals from court rulings in 
civil liberties and economic liberties cases, and the Warren Court was more likely to grant 
certiorari in conservative economic liberties cases, but not in conservative civil liberties disputes); 
Robert L. Boucher, Jr., & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision 
Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995) 
(examining certiorari and merits votes of Vinson Court Justices from 1946 through 1952 and 
finding that Justices who voted to reverse a lower court decision were significantly more likely to 
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Both Rehnquist Courts, like past Supreme Courts, reversed the majority of 
circuit court decisions that they reviewed, but the second Rehnquist Court was 
much more likely to reverse circuit decisions.31  The second Rehnquist Court 
has achieved a reversal rate that is 11% higher than the first Rehnquist Court’s, 
as reflected in Table 1.  Of particular interest, the second Rehnquist Court was 
much more likely to reverse liberal appeals court rulings (a 16.1% increase in 
reversals of liberal rulings as compared to a 5.5% increase in reversals of 
conservative rulings).  If the rate of reversal had increased without regard to 
ideology, then the second Rehnquist Court would, on average, be overturning 
liberal cases 66.2% of the time and conservative decisions 59.4% of the time, 
rather than 69.4% and 56.7%, respectively. 
 
have voted for certiorari than Justices who voted to affirm); Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, 
Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 51 J. POL. 828, 832-833 
(1989) (concluding, based on a sample of cases from selected terms of the Vinson, Warren, and 
Burger Courts, that Justices who voted in favor of certiorari were more likely to vote to reverse 
than Justices who opposed certiorari, termed an “error-correcting strategy”). 
 31. We rely on the Spaeth Supreme Court Database for calculation of figures reflected here.  
See Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2001 
Terms, at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). 
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TABLE 1 
 
Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Rehnquist I vs. Rehnquist II 
 
 
  REVERSALS OF LOWER COURT 
  REHNQUIST I REHNQUIST II 
All 
Circuits 
Liberal 59.8% 
(222) 
69.4% 
(197) 
Conservative 53.7% 
(186) 
56.7% 
(157) 
Total 56.9%  
63.0% 
FOURTH 
CIRCUIT 
Liberal 66.7 % 
(16) 
76.9% 
(10) 
Conservative 45.5% 
(15) 
62.2% 
(23) 
Total 54.4% 66.0% 
Ninth 
Circuit 
Liberal 66.3% 
(63) 
78.2% 
(79) 
Conservative 42.3% 
(18) 
70.7% 
(29) 
Total 59.1% 76.1% 
 
All data drawn from the Spaeth Supreme Court Database. 
The number in parentheses is the total number of cases in that cell. 
  
In order to get a sense of what is happening at a circuit level, we break out 
the two circuits currently described as the most ideologically extreme in Table 
1, and we compare the change in reversal rates for all circuits in Figure 2.  The 
change between the first and second Rehnquist Courts is most evident in its 
treatment of the most conservative circuit, the Fourth, and the most liberal, the 
Ninth.32  The Fourth Circuit generated the second highest number of Supreme 
 
 32. See David Firestone, With New Administration, Partisan Battle Resumes Over a Federal 
Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at A13 (reporting battle between Fourth Circuit 
senators over circuit seen as extremely conservative); Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model 
of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES., May 24, 1999, at A1 (describing the Fourth Circuit as 
“the boldest conservative court in the nation, in the view of scholars, lawyers and many of its own 
members”). 
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Court cases during the second Rehnquist Court (fifty) and one of the highest 
reversal rates (66%).  The second Rehnquist Court reviewed more than twice 
as many conservative Fourth Circuit cases as liberal ones.  The Court, 
however, did not do so to adopt the lower court’s position: It reversed more 
than 62% of the Fourth Circuit’s conservative decisions between 1994 to 2001, 
compared to approximately 57% of all conservative circuit cases during that 
period, and less than 46% of Fourth Circuit conservative rulings between 1986 
and 1993.33  One well-known example of the Supreme Court restraining the 
conservative lower court is Dickerson v. United States in which seven Justices, 
in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision that a federal statute effectively overruled Miranda rights.34 
 
 33. For a discussion of the 1999-2000 term, see Marcia Coyle, Fourth Circuit No Longer a 
Star Pupil, NAT’L L.J., July 10, 2000, at A4. 
 34. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Supreme Court Reversal Rates of Circuits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 The Ninth Circuit, with twenty-eight active judgeships and nearly five 
thousand merits rulings annually, is easily the largest court of appeals and, 
likely, the most liberal.35  The first Rehnquist Court reversed the Ninth Court 
slightly more often than average (59.1% compared to 56.9%), but less 
frequently than four other circuits, as shown in Figure 2.  Under the second 
Rehnquist Court, the Ninth Circuit is by far the most reviewed and the most 
reversed court of appeals.36  The reason, however, is not only liberal rulings: 
The Supreme Court reviewed forty-one conservative Ninth Circuit rulings, 
overturning twenty-nine.  Yet, the Court is much more likely to hear 
challenges to liberal Ninth Circuit holdings and to side with the challengers. 
One reasonable inference to draw from the reversal rate evidence is that 
the second Rehnquist Court was more efficiently and effectively monitoring 
 
 35. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United 
States Courts, 2001, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/contents.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2003) (reporting the number of judgeships and cases in 2001 term); Michelle Munn, Don’t Split 
9th Circuit, House Panel Is Told, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2002, § 2, at 8 (describing how debate 
over dividing the court is dominated by accusations of ideological bias in its decisionmaking). 
 36. At the beginning of the current term, the unanimous Supreme Court summarily reversed 
three Ninth Circuit rulings all in one day.  See Jason Hoppin, Ninth Circuit Reversed Three Times 
in One Day, S.F. RECORDER, Nov. 5, 2002, at 1. 
     
0%   
10%   
20%   
30%   
40%   
50%   
60%   
70%   
80%   
10
th
 C
ir
6t
h 
C
ir
7t
h 
C
ir
11
th
 C
ir
9t
h 
C
ir
8t
h 
C
ir
A
ll 
C
irc
ui
ts
4t
h 
C
i r
2n
d 
C
ir
D
C
 C
ir
5t
h 
C
ir
3r
d 
C
ir
1s
t C
ir
Rehn I (1986-93) 
Rehn II (1994-01) 
     
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
830 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:819 
lower courts, granting review to cases that were more likely to be divergent.  
The Court focused on the outlier circuits, and, therefore, it could hear fewer 
cases to monitor.  This conclusion is consistent with Merrill’s analysis of the 
second Rehnquist Court as a more stable one.37  The first Rehnquist Court 
reviewed more circuit cases on average (ninety) than the second (seventy).  
The relative decline in circuit cases (22%), however, was lower than the 
decline in cases from other courts (50%).  Again, informative differences can 
be seen by looking at the circuit level. 
 
 37. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 638-51. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Rehnquist I (1986-1993) Percentage Points Over/Under-represented in 
Supreme Court Docket 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
Rehnquist II (1994-2001) Percentage Points Over/Under-represented in 
Supreme Court Docket 
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IV.  CIRCUIT COURTS INFLUENCING THE REHNQUIST COURT 
Congress, on some occasions, grants regulatory agencies discretion in 
order to allow for experimentation or development in policies that Congress 
can later codify in statute.  We can observe the same behavior in the second 
Rehnquist Court.  As Merrill delineates, the second Rehnquist Court can be 
defined by the changes it has made in federalism doctrine.38  We consider how 
this substantive shift followed decisions of lower courts in federalism cases. 
The watershed case of the second Rehnquist Court must be United States 
v. Lopez.39  The Fifth Circuit panel that heard the case described it as one of 
first impression: a challenge to the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990.40  The panel had one Reagan appointee, William Garwood, 
and two Carter appointees, Thomas Reavley and Carolyn Dineen King.  The 
judges unanimously reversed the defendant’s conviction on the ground that 
Congress had overstepped its Commerce Clause authority in passing the Act.  
In so doing, the panel acknowledged that it knew “of no Supreme Court 
decision in the last half century that has set aside such a finding as without 
rational basis.  However, the Court has never renounced responsibility to 
invalidate legislation as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.”41  The 
decision is ideologically mixed: It rules for the criminal defendant, typically a 
liberal outcome, while ruling against federal government encroachment on 
state powers, traditionally a conservative position. 
The panel’s decision was greeted with much criticism as well as praise, but 
most notably with a great deal of publicity because it marked a rare occasion 
when a federal court struck down a federal statute as unconstitutional based on 
the Commerce Clause.  Despite the weightiness of the decision, the Fifth 
Circuit did not proceed en banc as requested by the losing U.S. Attorney.42  A 
Ninth Circuit panel addressed the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School 
Zone Act within a few months, and it explicitly disagreed with the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding.43  Ninth Circuit Judge Alarcon communicated that there was 
 
 38. See id. at 584-85. 
 39. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 40. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 41. See id. at 1364 n.43 (emphasis added). 
 42. United States v. Lopez, 9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993) (reporting without explanation the 
circuit’s denial of suggestion for rehearing en banc). 
 43. United States. v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated & remanded by, 
514 U.S. 1093 (1995) (recognizing that the panel’s decision “will create an intercircuit conflict 
with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion”).  The Edwards panel held that the case was controlled by a prior 
Ninth Circuit case that could only be overturned by the en banc circuit.  The panel, however, did 
not recommend en banc hearing because “we disagree with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Lopez.”  
Id.  After Lopez, five district judges also issued published opinions on the constitutionality of the 
Gun-Free School Zone Act: three finding the Act within the Commerce Clause power, two 
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a breach of the relational agreement: “With respect, we believe the Fifth 
Circuit has misinterpreted, or refused to follow, the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court that are binding on all courts inferior to our nation’s 
highest court.”44 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the circuit split, perhaps 
responding to arguments from many sources that the Fifth Circuit had acted 
outside its authority.  The resulting opinions reflect circuit and district court 
opinions on the Act.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, 
discussed at much greater length the history of America’s federalist system, 
but ultimately accepted Garwood’s analysis.  The Supreme Court had the 
benefit of a full consideration of all arguments for and against the 
constitutionality of the Act, and it accepted the position of a panel that to many 
appeared to be a runaway.  In fact, the panel had correctly anticipated the 
majority’s position.45 
The developments in the circuit courts are not always in line with changes 
in the Supreme Court.  Merrill describes the sharp decline in social issues 
relative to federalism issues on the Court docket as a telling distinction 
between the two eras.46  For example, the Court heard five substantive abortion 
cases in the 1986-1993 period, but only one from 1994 to 2001.47  The number 
of published abortion decisions in the circuit courts increased between the two 
periods (from twenty-six cases to forty), even controlling for the increase in 
lower court caseload.48  The lower courts could not refuse to hear these cases, 
but they could have selected to issue unpublished rulings as is usual in cases 
involving settled legal questions. 
However, the one Supreme Court abortion ruling after 1993, Stenberg v. 
Carhart,49 is a good example of the Court’s role as monitor of lower courts.  
 
adopting Lopez’s position.  Compare United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994), 
United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994), and United States v. Holland, 841 
F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1993), with United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Kan. 1994) 
(“With due respect to the Ninth Circuit, the court finds the views articulated by the Fifth Circuit 
to be more faithful to the values of federalism embodied in our Constitution.”), and United States 
v. Morrow, 834 F.Supp. 364 (N.D. Ala. 1993).  The most striking conflict was that two Kansas 
defendants, Glover and Trigg, who were accomplices, but were tried separately, found themselves 
with opposite outcomes. 
 44. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294. 
 45. In a later Commerce Clause case, the divided en banc Fourth Circuit in United States v. 
Morrison made a dramatic ruling that the Supreme Court ultimately accepted.  Brzonkala v. Va. 
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  The en banc court reversed a contrary panel ruling.  See 
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 46. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 580-85, 581 fig.3. 
 47. Id. at 654 app.A. 
 48. These numbers reflect a search of the Westlaw Court of Appeals Database. 
 49. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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Stenberg involved a ban on “partial birth abortions.”  Five circuit courts had 
struck down state partial birth abortion bans as unconstitutionally vague or 
imposing an undue burden on a women’s right of privacy.50  The only circuit to 
reach a different conclusion was the Seventh Circuit in a closely divided en 
banc case, Hope Clinic v. Ryan.51  Judge Frank Easterbrook, a well-known 
jurist and scholar, authored the majority opinion.  Judge Richard Posner, an 
even better known jurist and scholar, penned for the four dissenters, claiming 
in the end that his analysis was based on “[t]he Constitution as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in decisions that we are not free to palter with.”52  The 
Supreme Court agreed with Posner and the five circuits. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Merrill ably demonstrates that Supreme Court decisions should 
be examined as the product of an inherently political institution.  Observers 
who assert that Justices are best understood as prophets of the law are 
practicing an intellectual sleight of hand that allows them to ignore the non-
doctrinal factors that affect judicial behavior.  Such an effort is understandable.  
The Court is a much more complicated subject if its rulings reflect nonlegal 
factors as well as legal ones.  The desire, however, to ignore the true character 
of the Court produces accounts of its behavior that are inadequate, incorrect, or 
wholly without content. 
Legal scholars who want to explain court decisions must consider closely 
the analysis offered by Merrill as well as his methodology.  Moreover, scholars 
who wish to prescribe legal rules without understanding Merrill’s arguments 
risk folly for they fail to consider how rules are adopted and applied by courts. 
 
 
 50. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2000); Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 
1999); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999); Summitt Med. 
Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 
F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 51. 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacated summarily, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000). 
 52. Id. at 890 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
